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IN THE 
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Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
Herbert Landry, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for aggravated arson, a first degree 
felony. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) (West 
Supp. 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Was the evidence sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for 
aggravated arson where defendant was seen hurriedly leaving his apartment 
immediately before the fire started, fire experts testified that the fire was 
intentionally set by use of an ignitable liquid, and defendant's story at trial was 
incredible? 
Standard of Review. When a jury verdict is challenged on the ground that the 
evidence is insufficient,... '[w]e review the evidence and all inferences which may 
reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdictf, and w]e 
reverse . . . only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted/" State v. 
Hirschi, 2007 UT App 255, \ 15,167 P.3d 503 (quoting State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 
232,236 (Utah 1992)). 
STATUTE 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-103 (West 2004). Aggravated arson. 
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated arson if by means of fire or 
explosives he intentionally and unlawfully damages: 
(a) a habitable structure; or 
(b) any structure or vehicle when any person not a participant in the 
offense is in the structure or vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated arson is a felony of the first degree. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with aggravated arson in violation of Utah 
Code Annotated § 76-6-103. Rl. At trial, as the jury retired, defendant moved 
for a directed verdict, which the trial court denied. R11954-55. The jury 
convicted defendant. R51,60-59. The trial court sentenced defendant to an 
indeterminate term of five years to life in prison. R60-59. After the trial court 
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reinstated his time to appeal, defendant filed a timely notice, appealing his 
judgment and conviction. R93,115. The case was transferred to this Court 
from the Utah Supreme Court. See Appellate Courts Docket entry for March 
12,2008, for this case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State's Case-in-Chief 
In the late afternoon of February 26,2006, a fire burned apartment number 11 
of the Shadow Way Apartments in Provo, Utah, causing $183,000 in damage. 
R118:83-85, 88-89114-15. The tenants living in Apartment 1 of Shadow Way 
Apartments, Matthew and Britney Mendel, saw defendant walk by their window 
toward his apartment that afternoon. Id. at 83,85-86. Ten minutes later, they saw 
defendant and another person leave in a hurry, and five minutes after that they 
noticed smoke coming from defendant's apartment. Id. at 85-86,93,96. Defendant 
was to quit apartment 11 that day because he was being evicted. Id. at 86,114,118-
19. 
Rex Nelson, a fire investigator with Unified Fire in Salt Lake City, 
investigated the fire at nine o'clock that evening with a certified accelerant canine 
("arson dog") named Oscar. Id. at 101,103. Oscar received six weeks of accelerant 
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training from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. Id. at 101-102. Oscar 
also underwent six weeks of training with Rex Nelson. Id. at 102. Nelson has also 
undergone training in using an arson dog to find accelerants. Id. Oscar was trained 
to detect the presence of ignitable liquids such as kerosene, Coleman fuel, lighter 
fluid, and charcoal lighter gasoline. Id. Oscar was not trained to detect alcohol. Id. 
at 107. 
Nelson tested Oscar before using him to investigate the scene to ensure 
Oscar's nose was working properly. Id. at 104. Oscar alerted Nelson to the presence 
of ignitable Hquids in three separate locations in defendant's bedroom, which 
Nelson considered to be the origin of the fire. Id. at 104-105,108.1 
Later that day, Nelson took Oscar to the motel where defendant was staying. 
Id. at 106. There, Nelson asked defendant to remove his socks and shoes and place 
them on the bed. Id. Oscar alerted on one of the socks and one shoe. Id. 
Provo City Police Officer Drew Hubbard interviewed defendant several hours 
after the fire. Id. at 121-22. According to the notes that officer Hubbard wrote at the 
time of the interview, defendant gave no explanation for the cause of the fire. Id. at 
1
 The first spot was located two feet inside the door against the base of the 
north wall; the second, was also along the north wall, a few feet east of the first spot; 
and the third was just beyond the bed in the southeast corner of the room. 
R118:104-05. 
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122-123. Also, defendant did not show concern for his belongings, nor did he ask if 
he might retrieve his belongings or if they were okay. Id. 
Russ Marshal Sneddon, a fire marshal with the Orem Fire Marshal's Office, 
arrived to investigate the fire when the scene was "winding down/7 and most of the 
fire had been "knocked down/7 Id. at 132-133. Marshal Sneddon had been trained 
in origin and cause analysis and, as a fire marshal, was responsible for the 
investigation of fires in his jurisdiction. Id. at 134. He narrowed the origin of the fire 
down to a spot on the floor just south of the north wall and just west of defendant's 
bed. Id. at 137-140. He first eliminated any accidental cause—"unattended candle, 
[] discarded lighter material, malfunctioning electrical equipment[,] [s]omething like 
that"—for lack of any evidence. Id. at 140. Marshal Sneddon examined the V-
shaped burn patterns on the wall and the patterns on the floor /which indicated that 
a "significant" amount of an ignitable liquid had "poured or flow[ed]" on the floor 
which then ignited. Id. at 140-142,147. He considered that the liquid might have 
been spilled instead of poured, but ruled out this possibility because he did not find 
any ignitable liquid container at the scene. Id. at 140-141,148. Rather, Marshal 
Sneddon's expert opinion was that the fire was started intentionally by the lighting 
of an ignitable liquid, which had been poured onto the floor a couple of feet from 
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the bed and then towards and alongside the north wall. Id. at 143,148.2 Outside the 
apartment complex, Marshal Sneddon found a discarded lighter. Id. at 150-51. 
Jim Guynn, a Provo City Fire Marshal, directed the investigation of the fire. 
Id. at 159,161. Marshal Guynn, who had been involved in fire investigations for 
nine years, had been trained at the National Fire Academy at the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, and Firearms in fire origin and cause, arson detection, and management of 
arson cases. Id. at 159-160. Both the Utah Chapter of the International Association 
of Arson Investigators and the National Association of Fire Investigators certified 
him. Id. at 160. 
Marshal Guynn, too, determined that the fire was caused intentionally. Id. at 
163. He surveyed the damage in the apartment and examined the burn patterns in 
the apartment. Id. at 163-167. Using a piece of subfioor that he recovered from 
2
 Various remnants of the apartment were taken into evidence and sent to the 
crime laboratory,. Id. at 151-52. Only two tested positive for heptane, a substance 
found in ignitable liquids. Id. 146,152; State's Exhibit 4 (Criminalistic Analysis 
Report). At the request of the defense, the parties stipulated that heptane could be 
found in substances such as the flooring glue. Id. at 153. On cross-examination, 
Marshal Sneddon testified that heptane is a flammable substance, but to the extent 
that it might have been present in the construction materials within the floor, it 
would not have been present in amounts sufficient to cause the kind of damage he 
found, nor would it explain the pour patterns he discovered. R118:146-47. He also 
noted that, although possible, in testing his Office had conducted "[i]t's very 
difficult"to start a fire with a discarded cigarette Id. at 149. 
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defendant's bedroom, he pointed to fire-generated patterns that had burned 
through the carpet into the subflooring. Id. at 164-66,179; State's Exhibit 7. Those 
patterns could only have resulted from an ignitable flowing substance. Id. at 166-67. 
He further explained why the crime laboratory failed to detect any ignitable 
substance other than heptane, in the floor. Id. at 169-70. He suggested that if 
alcohol, which is readily absorbed in water, was the ignitable liquid used to start 
the fire, it might have been washed away by the enormous volume of water used to 
extinguish the fire. Id.; State's Exhibit 4 (Criminalistic Analysis Report). 
Additionally, he did not think that the amount of heptane in the flooring materials 
could have contributed significantly to the fire. Id. at 190. Based on the lack of 
identifiable fire load—"there were very few things in the room to burn, a few 
clothes,... a couple of small furniture items, the mattress, and the floor coverings, 
and then any other combustible surface in the construction itself"—the very rapid 
progress of the fire, the absence of other ignition sources, electrical failure, remains 
of cigarettes, he determined that the fire was "intentionally set" by "the application 
of [anjopen flame.. .to an ignitable liquid." Id. at 171-73 
Marshal Guynn also rejected the likelihood that the fire was started by a 
smoldering cigarette. R118:184. He testified that, because a lit cigarette does not 
develop sufficient heat to ignite flammable resistive fabrics, "it would be very 
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difficult, if at all possible, to light plywood on fire by discarding a cigarette/7 
although it might ignite an ignitable substance on the floor R118:184-85,190-91. 
Marshal Guynn interviewed defendant after the fire and asked him about 
various potential causes of the fire, including problems with electrical components, 
electrical wires, and chemicals that could decompose and self-heat. Id. at 162. 
Defendant agreed that none of these potential causes were present. Id. at 163. 
Defendant also denied noticing any odd odors, odors of smoke, or any other 
indication that a fire was already smoldering when he left the apartment. Id. 
Defendant denied having any smoking materials in the room. Id. at 172-74. 
Accordingly, from defendant's responses and his physical investigation at the scene, 
Marshal Guynn ruled out that the fire was accidental. Id. at 162-63. 
The Defense 
David Turpin, defendant's neighbor in apartment 10, testified that, about 
three or four o'clock on the afternoon of the fire, he heard a knock, which he thought 
was at his door. R119:4-6. When he opened his door, he saw a "tall, narrow" black 
man with a goatee and shaggy beard, who wore dark clothes, a dark hat, and 
glasses, standing outside defendant's door . at 5-8. When Turpin left his apartment 
ten minutes later, he noticed that the cardboard in the window next to defendant's 
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front door had been pushed in. Id. at 6-7. As he reached the bottom of the stairs, he 
heard a door slam, that "possibl[y] could have been [the stranger] leaving. Id. at 7. 
Defendant testified that the night before he was to leave his apartment, he had 
a party at his apartment; alcohol was spilled near the wall and close to his bed. Id. at 
14 -15. The next day, he and his girlfriend, Josephine, were at the apartment 
watching T.V. from his bed. Id. at 15-16. Josephine was smoking. Id. at 16. After 
they left the apartment, he went to the Travel Lodge and had some drinks with 
some friends. Id. at 18. He left the door to his apartment unlocked. Id. at :20. 
Defendant acknowledged that he was in his apartment just before the fire started. 
Id. 
Defendant was a victim of Hurricane Katrina. Id. at 11-12. He claimed that he 
had two television sets, a DVD player, a VCR, clothes, and his diabetes and blood 
pressure medicine in the apartment, all of which had been paid for with FEMA 
disaster pay. Id. at 13. He said, "I lost everything [in the fire]/' Id. He was going 
back to Texas to rejoin his family. Id. at 17. He had had sex with Josephine. Id. at 18. 
On cross-examination, defendant was unable to clearly explain why he had 
failed to mention Josephine, the cigarettes, or the alcohol when he was interviewed 
by Marshal Guynn and Nelson. Id. at 22-24. He did not know Josephine's last name 
or any last names of his friends at the party the night before the fire. Id. at 22. When 
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asked why the photographs of the burned closet did not show any burned clothes, 
defendant replied that it was because the clothes were in a suitcase on the floor. Id. 
He could not explain why there was no evidence of a burned suitcase on the floor. 
Id. at 25. 
On rebuttal, Marshal Guynn asserted that he discussed with defendant a 
variety of possible causes of the fire, including "smoking materials," to all of which 
defendant answered, "No, there was not." Id. at 27 Defendant never mentioned the 
party, the spilled alcohol or that Josephine has smoked the next day. Id. at 27-28. 
Marshal Guynn said that he "would struggle" to concede that alcohol that was 
spilled even late on Saturday night would still be present Sunday afternoon. Id. at 
29. And even if those vapors were present, they would "explode" upon ignition: 
"[i]gnitable liquid vapors cannot smolder It's just not possible" Id. at 28-29. 
Thus, "if those vapors were ignited, they [would be] instantly converted to flaming 
combustion and the people present would know." Id. at 29. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of 
aggravated arson. Defendant, however, has failed to meet his burden to marshal the 
very substantial evidence on the only two disputed issues at trial: that the fire was 
incendiary in nature and that he was the person who set the fire. Specifically, 
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defendant has failed to marshal the evidence showing the extent of the two 
prosecution experts' investigation of the causes of the fire, the experts' explicit 
elimination of any accidental causes for the fire, including defendant's suggestion 
that the fire might have been caused by a smoldering cigarette that ignited alcohol 
accidentally spilled at a party the night before the fire, and the experts' detailed 
discussion of the burn patterns found in defendant's apartment indicating that the 
fire had been started by the deliberate pouring and igniting of a flammable liquid, 
possibly alcohol. Defendant has also failed to marshal the evidence that it was he 
who set the fire. That evidence consisted of witnesses' testimony that defendant 
hurriedly left his apartment only five minutes before they saw smoke coming from 
defendant's apartment, that defendant appeared unconcerned about belongings 
which he claimed to have left in the apartment, that defendant's conduct during his 
stay in the apartment indicated a lack of personal accountability leading to eviction 
proceedings, and that defendant's interviews with the police undercut his defense at 
trial. Based on defendant's failure to adequately marshal the substantial evidence 
in support of the jury's verdict, the Court should decline to consider defendant's 
claim of insufficient evidence on its merits. 
The bulk of unmarshaled evidence constitutes the very basis for concluding 
that there was sufficient evidence that defendant committed aggravated arson. 
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Contrary to defendant's argument, it is not necessary that the State's case preclude 
every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Rather, is sufficient that the State prove 
every element beyond a reasonable doubt Convictions for arson cases are generally 
based on circumstantial evidence. Cases discussing the sufficiency of evidence in 
arson cases support the outcome in this case, where there was overwhelming 
evidence of an incendiary fire and the defendant's explanation was either incredible 
or seriously disputed. Here, evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that defendant was guilty of committing aggravated arson. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO CONSIDER DEFENDANT'S CLAIM 
OF INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE BECAUSE HE HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL 
THE EVIDENCE; IN ANY EVENT, THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO 
PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT DEFENDANT 
COMMITTED AGGRAVATED ARSON 
Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of 
aggravated arson: "The circumstantial evidence in this case did not establish 
beyond a reasonable doubt that [defendant] committed the crime or that he had the 
requisite intent/' Aplt. Br. 16-17. 
The claim fails for two reasons. First, defendant has failed to marshal the 
evidence in support of the jury's verdict. Therefore, the court should not consider 
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the claim. Second, even considering the claim, the evidence was sufficient to convict 
defendant of arson. 
A, Defendant has failed to marshal the evidence; therefore, the Court 
should decline to consider his claim of insufficient evidence, 
1. The marshaling standard. 
An appellate court "will reverse a jury verdict only when, after viewing the 
evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict, 
[the court] find[s] that the evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or 
was so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and 
unjust/' State v. Martinez, 2002 UT App 126,f40,47 P.3d 115 (citations omitted). 
The burden is on the appellant to "marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial 
court's findings of fact and then demonstrate that the evidence, including all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings 
against an attack." State v. Larsen, 2000 UT App 106, \ 11,999 P.2d 1252 (citation 
omitted).3 To meet this burden, an appellant "must present, in comprehensive and 
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which 
supports the very findings the appellant resists." Martinez, 2002 UT App 126,f40. 
3
 The burden to marshal all the evidence, "including all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom," applies equally in a criminal case tried to a jury. See e.g., State v. 
Fredrickson, 2008 UT App 10, p.l (per curiam) (memorandum decision). 
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"After compiling all evidence in support of the verdict, the appellant must then 
show that there is a flaw in the evidence, sufficient to show that the verdict is clearly 
erroneous-" Id. (citation omitted)- Failure to marshal the evidence may result in the 
appellate court's refusal to consider the merits of a claim of insufficient evidence. 
See e.g., State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, §§ 14,16,989 R2d 1065. 
To convict defendant of aggravated arson, the State was required to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt the following elements of the offense: (1) defendant; (2) 
by means of fire; (3) intentionally and unlawfully; (4) damaged a habitable structure. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-103.4 
Defendant does not contest that his apartment was a habitable structure or 
that it was damaged by fire. Rather, he contends that the evidence was insufficient 
to show that he intentionally and unlawfully caused the damage. Aplt. Br. at 21.-24. 
Although defendant acknowledges the marshaling requirement, he fails to 
fulfill it Aplt. Br. at 21-23. 
4
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-103 (West 2004) provides: 
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated arson if by means of fire or explosives he 
intentionally and unlawfully damages: 
(a) a habitable structure^] 
14 
2. Unmarshaled evidence of defendant's intent—that defendant 
intentionally set the fire in his apartment. 
Defendant has failed to marshal the following evidence proving that he 
intentionally lit the fire: 
a. Evidence of defendant's hurried retreat from his burning 
apartment. 
Defendant states that the Mendels saw "[defendant] leave approximately five 
to ten minutes before they learned of the fire in his apartment." Aplt. Br. at 21. This 
statement misstates and depreciates three significant aspects of Matthew Mendels' 
testimony, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution. First, Mr. Mendel 
refined his estimation of the time between his seeing defendant leave the apartment 
and the fire to only "five" minutes. R118:90. Second, Mr. Mendel did not merely 
see defendant "leave" his apartment, but rather opined that defendant "seemed to 
be in a hurry." Id. at 93. Last, Mr. Mendel did not merely "learn[] of the fire," which 
could suggest that his estimation of the timing of events was based on inaccurate 
hearsay. Rather, he saw defendant leave his apartment five minutes before he 
actually "noticed the smoke" from the fire, a more definitive statement based on 
first-hand experience. Id. at 86. In short, the correct characterization of Mr. 
Mendel's testimony emphasizes defendant's immediate temporal connection to the 
15 
fire and his deliberate attitude about it, a fact and a reasonable inference absent from 
his marshaling of the evidence. 
b. Defendant's challenged and doubtful testimony. 
Defendant claimed that he 'lost everything" in the fire, including two 
television sets and a suitcase packed with his clothes, which he left on the floor. 
R119:13,24-25. He neglects to mention, however, that Marshal Sneddon's report 
indicated that the only items in the apartment were remnants of a burnt stool, an 
umbrella, and some clothing. R118:149. Defendant also fails to mention that 
Marshal Guynn f ound the remains of only a "f ew clothes" in his bedroom, that there 
was little to no fire debris in the clothes closet, and that he (defendant) was unable 
to explain why the fire marshals had found no evidence of a suitcase. Id. at 171,187; 
R119:24-25. 
At trial, defendant testified that the night before he was to leave his 
apartment, friends spilled alcohol near the wall and close to his bed. Rl 19:14-15. 
He also testified that while his girlfriend, Josephine, visited with him the next day at 
his apartment—the day of the fire—she smoked. Id. at 15-16. Defendant so testified 
to suggest that he did not intentionally start the fire, but rather that the fire may 
have been an accident. However, defendant does not mention that, when Marshal 
Guynn interviewed him on the night of fire, or in the months that followed, he 
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never related those exculpatory "facts'7 or that he could not think of any "smoking 
materials" or other causes of fire in his apartment. Id. at 27-28. Defendant does not 
mention that when City Police Officer Drew Hubbard interviewed him several 
hours after the fire, he did not show concern for his belongings, nor did he ask if he 
might retrieve his belongings or if they were okay. R118:121-23. Defendant does 
not mention that he failed to show up for a walk-through of his apartment with the 
building manager the night he was to quit the premises. Id. at 119. Nor does 
defendant mention that there was evidence that showed he had little regard for the 
apartment, having broken through door in a fight with a drug dealer on one 
occasion and broken a window to enter the apartment some months later because he 
did not have a key. Id. at 117-18. 
These unmarshaled facts cast defendant in a light that showed him to be 
incredible, untrustworthy, and irresponsible. Such facts, characterizing a 
defendant's testimony as they do, are significant in an arson case, where proof is 
generally based on circumstantial evidence. See e.g., State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470,472 
n.3 (Utah 1991) ("[Circumstantial evidence] may be the only way of establishing a 
case of [aggravated] arson, which usually is based on secret preparation and 
activity.") (citation omitted); State v. Clark, 675 P.2d 557, 562 (Utah 1983) 
("defendants' contradictory and confusing accounts of their actions offer no 
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reasonable explanation for the fire" in aggravated arson case in view of evidence of 
use of fire accelerants); State v. Bergzverff, 777 P.2d 510, 512-12 (Utah App. 1989) 
(upholding verdict in case of conflicting evidence, where the prosecution's experts 
testified that lamp oil had been poured on carpet and fire intentionally set, and the 
defense theorized that the fire started from spontaneous combustion of bird 
droppings in a vacuum cleaner);Sfafe v. Tabesh, 2005 UT App 353, pp. 1-2 (per 
curiam) (memorandum decision) (holding evidence sufficient to show that fire was 
intentionally set where, among other facts, arsonist "acted calmly and without haste 
once alerted to the existence of the fire"). 
2. Unmarshaled evidence that the fire was set intentionally. 
Defendant also substantially fails to marshal the evidence and inferences from 
that evidence that the fire was incendiary in nature. He correctly states that the 
experts concluded that the fire was intentionally set because they found no 
accidental causes and because the burn patterns indicated that an ignitable liquid 
had been poured on the floor and then ignited. Aplt.Br.at22. Defendant, however, 
cites only seven pages of the prosecution's expert testimony with no details on 
which the experts' opinions were based. Id. (citing R118:140-43, 165-67). 
Specifically, defendant's rendition does not include specific reference to testimony 
given by Marshal Sneddon: (1) elimination of any accidental cause—"unattended 
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candle, [] discarded lighter material, malfunctioning electrical equipment" 
(R118:140); (2) examination of the V-shaped burn patterns on the wall and the 
patterns on the floor, which indicated that a //significant/, amount of an ignitable 
liquid had been "poured or flowjed]" on the floor (Id. at 140-142,147); (3) rejection 
of defendant's suggestion that the fire might have been significantly fed by the 
modest amount of heptane, an ignitable material, typically found in building 
materials, based on the pour patterns and the type and amount of damage found; 
(Id. at 145-47); (4) elimination of accidental spill of ignitable liquid, based on failure 
to discover a container (Id. at 140-41,148); (5) discovery that the burn patterns led 
from the bed to the wall, confirming the same pattern alerted on by the arson dog 
(Id. at 104-05,108,148)5; (6) discovery of a discarded lighter outside the apartment 
complex (id. at 150-51). 
5
 The State relies on evidence that the arson dog, Oscar, alerted to locations in 
defendant's bedroom to the extent that they were confirmed by an expert's 
independent investigation. See State v. Schultz, 2002 UT App 2002 Ut App 366, \ \ 
32-35,42,58 P.3d 879 (Davis, J., writing and Thorne, J., concurring) (harmless error 
where evidence of canine accelerant detection confirmed by expert's independent 
analysis of burn patterns and absence of fuel load). Here, Oscar's alerts were 
independently confirmed by Marshal Sneddon's analysis. Rl 18:140-43. On the 
other hand, the State does not rely on Oscar's alerts on defendant's sock and shoe as 
substantive evidence because those alerts were not confirmed by laboratory 
analysis. Id. at 106; State's Exhibit 4 (Criminalistic Analysis Report). See Schultz, 
2002 UT App 2002 Ut App 366, \ \ 26-27 (Davis, J., writing) (canine accelerant 
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Defendant's rendition also does not include specific reference to evidence 
given by Marshal Guynn: (1) demonstration to the jury of the fire-generated 
patterns in a sample of subfloor removed from defendant's bedroom (Id. at 164-66, 
179; State's Exhibit 7); (2) explanation that failure to detect any ignitable substance, 
like alcohol, in the floor might have been due to the enormous volume of water used 
to extinguish the fire (Id. at 167-70; State's Exhibit 4 (Criminalistic Analysis Report)); 
(3) opinion of near impossibility of defendant's suggestion that fire might have been 
caused by a smoldering cigarette, because a cigarette cannot develop sufficient heat 
to ignite flame resistant fabrics (Id. at 184-85,190-91); (4) opinion that alcohol spilled 
late the night before the fire would not be present the following day and that "if 
those vapors were ignited, they [would be] instantly converted to flaming 
combustion and the people present would know." (R119:29). 
Defendant does not marshal evidence in support of the inference, developed 
by the prosecution's two arson experts, that defendant started the fire not with a 
heptane-based ignitable liquid, but with alcohol. Specifically, defendant does not 
marshal Marshals Sneddon's and Guynn's testimony that heptane would neither 
have been in the flooring in sufficient amounts to account for the burn patterns and 
detection admissible as substantive evidence only if confirmed by laboratory 
analysis). See id. at I f 41-45 (Orme, J., and Thorne, J., concurring in result). 
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that alcohol, miscible in water, would have been washed away when the fire was 
being extinguished. R118:146, 169, 190. Further, he does not marshal Marshal 
Guynn's testimony, inferring that it was not heptane, but alcohol, that was the 
accelerant used as the fuel for the fire: "Well, [the crime laboratory] did identify a 
hydrocarbon there[—heptane], but they didn't identify one[—alcohol—] that I 
would think is responsible for the ignitable liquid pour." Id. at 170. Finally, 
defendant does not marshal the evidence that he admitted leaving his apartment on 
the afternoon of the fire with a bottle of Hennessy, a liquor containing alcohol. 
R119:16-17. 
In sum, because defendant has failed to marshal significant evidence that the 
fire was intentionally set and that it was he who set it, the Court should decline to 
consider defendant's claim of insufficient evidence on its merits. In any event, the 
evidence was sufficient. 
B. The evidence that defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt of aggravated arson was sufficient. 
1. Defendant makes no persuasive argument why the ordinary 
standard, that evidence be sufficient to prove him guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt, is an inadequate standard on 
appeal. 
In urging his claim of insufficient evidence, defendant argues that because the 
evidence was circumstantial, "the evidence supporting a conviction must preclude 
21 
every reasonable hypothesis of innocence/7 Aplt. Br, at 17 (quoting State v. Layman, 
953 P.2d 782,786 (Utah App. 1998) (Layman I)). 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that when the jury is correctly 
instructed on the requirement that it may convict a defendant only upon finding 
him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, there is no need to provide the jury with a 
reasonable-alternative-hypothesis instruction. See State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 
236 n.l (Utah 1992) ("With regard to the 'no reasonable alternative hypothesis7 
theory upon which defendant proceeds, we note that this court has previously 
indicated that this is only one way of stating the prosecution's burden of proof, 
which requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt") (citing State v. Eagle, 611 P.2d 
1211,1213 (Utah 1980)); State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301,1312 (Utah 1986) (affirming 
its rule that [a reasonable alternative hypothesis] instruction is unnecessary "'where 
the jury is instructed that the State must prove a defendant's guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt'") (quoting State v. Hansen, 710 P.2d 182,183 (Utah 1985)); State v. 
Schad, 24 Utah 2d 255, 257,470 P.2d 246, 247 (1970) ("[If 'from all of the facts and 
circumstances shown' the jurors] are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the 
defendant's guilt, it necessarily follows that they regarded the evidence as excluding 
every other reasonable hypothesis."); State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, f f 2,10, 985 P.2d 
911 (Layman IT) (holding that the court of appeals' application of the reasonable 
22 
alternative hypothesis doctrine was "problematic and unnecessary" and asserting 
that the case "should have been decided by applying an ordinary sufficiency of the 
evidence test"). 
Furthermore, the narrow command that circumstantial evidence must 
"preclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence," Layman I,953 P.2d at 786, has 
been recognized by this Court to overstate the reasonable doubt requirement. In 
State v. Lyman, 966 P.2d 278 (Utah App. 1998), the Court stated, "'[t]he existence of 
one or more alternate reasonable hypotheses does not necessarily prevent the jury 
from concluding that defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt/" Id. at 281 
(quoting State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688,695 (Utah App. 1995)). "'[W]e must simply 
insur[e] that there is sufficient evidence as to each element of the charge to enable 
the jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the 
crime/" Id. at 282 (quoting Blubaugh, id.). "[I]t is then within the province of the 
jury to judge the credibility of the testimony, assign weight to the evidence, and 
reject these alternate hypotheses.'" Id. (quoting Blubaugh, id.). 
Moreover, in an aggravated arson case, there is "a well-settled rule that 
circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused 
. . . if it is of such quality and quantity as to justify a jury in determining guilt 
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beyond a reasonable doubt, and is sufficient to sustain a conviction/' State v. Nickles, 
728 P.2d 123,126-27 (Utah 1986). 
Here, defendant makes no persuasive argument why the ordinary standard, 
that evidence be sufficient to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, is an 
inadequate standard on appeal. But, in any case, defendant has not presented the 
existence of any reasonable hypothesis of innocence. 
2. The standard of review. 
"In making the determination as to whether there is sufficient evidence to 
uphold a conviction, an appellate court does not sit as a second fact finder/' State v. 
Merila, 966 P.2d 270, 272 (Utah App. 1998) (citing State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 784 
(Utah 1991), quoting State v. Warden, 813 P.2d 1146,1150 (Utah 1991)). "It is the 
exclusive function of the jury to weigh the evidence and to determine the credibility 
of the witnesses." State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229,231 (Utah 1980). It is not the function 
of a reviewing court "to determine guilt or innocence, the weight to give conflicting 
evidence, the credibility of witnesses, or the weight to be given defendant's 
testimony." State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216,218 (Utah 1976) (citations omitted). "The 
mere existence of conflicting evidence, therefore, does not warrant reversal/" 
Warden, 813 P.2d at 1150 (citations omitted). "'Rather, the function of a reviewing 
court is limited to insuring that there is sufficient competent evidence regarding 
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each element of the charge to enable a jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
the defendant committed the crime/" Id. (citations omitted). "Therefore, when 
reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences that may be drawn therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to 
the jury verdict/7 Id. (citations omitted). "It is only when the evidence, viewed in 
this light, is so inconclusive or inherently improbable that a jury must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt that it is proper to 
overturn the conviction/' Id. (citations omitted). "'So long as there is some 
evidence, including reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the requisite 
elements of the crime can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops/" State v. Boss, 
2005 UT App 520, 9,127 P.3d 1236 (quoting State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, 67,27 P.3d 
1115). 
3. The evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction 
for aggravated arson where defendant was seen hurriedly 
leaving his apartment immediately before the fire started, fire 
experts testified that the fire was intentionally set by use of an 
ignitable liquid, and defendant's story at trial was incredible. 
Defendant essentially argues that evidence of his proximity to the fire, given 
that there was also evidence that a mysterious stranger might have set the fire, was 
insufficient to prove that he was the person who set the fire. Aplt Br. at 21,23. The 
Utah Supreme Court, however, has upheld arson convictions in which there was 
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conflicting evidence as to the defendant's setting the fire and the defendant's nexus 
to the fire was much the same as in this case. 
In State v. Linden, 657 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1983) (per curiam), the court upheld a 
conviction based on an arson investigator's opinion that the fire in a house was 
intentionally set with gasoline and the testimony of two eyewitnesses. Id. at 1365-
67. One of the witnesses saw a man he later identified as Linden running from the 
scene. Id. at 1366. The other witness saw a specific model car pull into a restaurant 
parking lot next to the site of the fire and watched the driver enter the restaurant. 
Id. Shortly thereafter, the house was aflame, and the driver left the scene. Id. The 
witness recorded the license plate number of the driver's car. When investigators 
interviewed Linden in California, they found in his carport the same model car with 
the same license plate number recorded by the witness. Id. Linden insisted that he 
had not been in Utah for ten years, even though he had in his possession a traffic 
citation issued to him in Utah. Id. In his defense, Linden produced three alibi 
witnesses who swore that Linden was in California at the time of the fire. Id. But 
"[v]iewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict," and recognizing 
that the jury "ha[d] the prerogative to select the most credible evidence in reaching 
its verdict," the court held that the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of 
arson. Id. See also State v. Clark, 675 P.2d 557, 562 (Utah 1983) ("defendants' 
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contradictory and confusing accounts of their actions offer no reasonable 
explanation for the fire" in aggravated arson case in view of evidence of use of fire 
accelerants). 
Here, as noted, at trial the only disputed elements of defendant's guilt for 
committing aggravated arson were whether the fire was intentionally set and 
whether he was the individual that set it. Aple. Br. at Al. In discussing the 
evidence that defendant failed to marshal, the State has substantially identified the 
evidence in support of the jury's verdict on these points. Aple. Br. at A2. 
Summarizing, the evidence that the fire was incendiary is as follows: Two experts 
concluded that the fire had been intentionally set (R118:143, 148, 162-63); their 
conclusions were based on (1) the careful elimination of long list of possible 
accidental causes, including an accidental spill of a flammable liquid or that such 
liquid might have been ignited by a cigarette without defendant's knowledge 
(R118:140-41, 148-49, 184-85, 190-91); (2) the presence of burn patterns around 
defendant's bed and the wall in his bedroom, indicating that a "significant" amount 
of an ignitable liquid, possibly alcohol, had been poured in those locations (id. at 
137-42,146-7,163-67,169-70,190); and the small amount of fire load found in the 
bedroom and the rapid progress of the fire (id. at 149,171-73). 
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Summarizing, the evidence that defendant set the fire is as follows: 
Defendant was seen hurriedly leaving the apartment complex only five minutes 
before witnesses saw smoke coming from defendant's apartment (id. at 86,90,93); 
defendant's credibility was doubtful; he claimed to have "lost everything," but 
neither substantial remnants of furniture nor defendant's alleged two televisions 
and VCR, nor a suitcase allegedly packed with clothes were found in the apartment 
(id. at 149,171,187; R119:13,24-25); defendant suggested the fire might have been 
caused by a smoldering cigarette after alcohol might have been accidentally spilled 
the night before, but there was no evidence that his companion had smoked, that 
volatile alcohol might have lingered from the night before, or that defendant 
believed in such possibilities immediately after the fire (Rl 18:184-85, 190-91, 
R119:15-16,27-29); defendant showed little concern for his allegedly lost property 
immediately after the fire (R118:122-23); and he had manifested, by breaking down a 
door and a window on two separate occasions, a disregard for the property he was 
renting, nor did he appear accountable for his apartment based on his disruptive 
conduct. R118:117-18. Defendant argues that "[c]ertainly, the requisite intent for 
aggravated arson cannot be inferred from the mere fact that [he] was being evicted." 
Aplt. Br. at 23. Contrary to defendant's argument, a small sampling of only recent 
cases establishes that an eviction may well motivate arson. See United States v. 
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Logan, 419 F.3d 172, 172 (2nd Cir. 2005) (fraternity members burn house in 
retaliation for eviction), cert, denied, Logan v. United States, 546 U.S. 1110 (2006); 
Maddox v. State, 612 S.E.2d 484,485 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (arson occasioned by the 
defendant's and her family's facing "imminent eviction as a result of foreclosure,,); 
Mey v. State, 604 S.E.2d 488,492-93 (Ga. 2004) (upholding sufficiency of evidence 
where, among other factors, the defendant had been denied welfare benefits and 
was facing eviction before he burned the trailer he was living in), cert, denied, Riley v. 
Georgia, 544 U.S. 1002 (2005); People v. Wojes, 763 N.Y.S.2d 103 (N.Y. App. .Div. 2003) 
(admissions that fire set out of vengeance stemming from eviction), leave to appeal 
denied, 798 N.E.2d 360 (N.Y. 2003). In any case, as set out above, imminent eviction 
was not the only evidence that defendant intentionally set his apartment ablaze. 
In sum, based on overwhelming evidence that the fire in defendant's 
apartment was incendiary in nature and substantial evidence that defendant was 
the person who set the fire, the evidence to support defendant's conviction for 
aggravated arson was sufficient. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
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